

Non-Military Preventive Efforts In Handling Human Rights Violations Against Armed Violent Groups in Papua, Indonesia

Mardiana¹, Adji Annisa Rahmadina², Sholihin Bone³

¹Faculty of Law, Mulawarman University, Samarinda, Indonesia

²Faculty of Law, Swadaya Gunung Jati University, Cirebon, Indonesia

³Faculty of Law, Mulawarman University, Samarinda, Indonesia

Received: October 08 2024

Revised: November 08 2024

Accepted: November 22 2024

Published: November 28 2024

Corresponding Author:

Author Name*:Mardiana

Email*:

mardianaresearch@gmail.com

Abstrak: *This research explores the non-military preventive approach as a solution to human rights violations committed by the Armed Violence Group (KKB) in Papua. Using normative juridical methods, this research examines human rights law regulations in Indonesia, literature studies, and analysis of Gus Dur's speeches and writings on the peaceful approach. The conflict in Papua, fueled by a history of discrimination, exploitation of natural resources, and centralized policies, has been exacerbated by an often ineffective military approach. Comprehensive solutions are needed to address the injustice, poverty and human rights violations experienced by Papuans. This research proposes a strategy based on inclusive dialog, local participation, and respect for Papuan identity. This approach is rooted in the principles of justice, equality and human values upheld by Gus Dur. In addition, efforts to empower the economy, education, and infrastructure development in favor of indigenous peoples are considered important for creating sustainable peace. The results show that conflict resolution in Papua requires not only security solutions, but also strategic steps that prioritize social welfare and human rights protection, thus strengthening national cohesion within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).*

Keywords : *Armed Violent Groups; Gus Dur; , Human Rights Violations; Papua, , Peaceful Approach,*

INTRODUCTION

Human rights are fundamental rights that every individual is born with, as a gift from God Almighty. In Indonesia, the recognition of human rights is reflected in the 1945 Constitution and various other laws and regulations, including the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution in the First and Fourth Paragraphs, and the Body of the 1945 Constitution. In addition, a number of Decrees of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) also regulate this matter, such as MPR Decree No. XVII/MPR/1998 which led to the birth of Law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights. This law plays a very important role in ensuring that these rights are guaranteed and fulfilled in Indonesia. Moreover, Law No. 26/2000 was also issued to regulate the Human Rights Court, providing a legal basis for resolving cases of human rights violations in the country (Widyantara, 2022).

As a state of law, Indonesia is responsible for guaranteeing civil and political rights for all its citizens. With the obligation to respect, protect and fulfill human rights, the state needs to take various steps and policies to ensure the achievement of these goals (Awaludin, 2012, p. 100). However,



Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License:

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>

centralized government and development policies are often unable to fulfill the principles of justice as a whole, guarantee the welfare of the people, or support effective law enforcement. In addition, in the context of handling human rights violations, especially for the Papuan people, respect for these rights is still very limited (*Law No. 21 of 2001*, n.d.). Many cases of human rights violations in Papua have occurred both overtly and covertly, but often do not receive public attention and have not been revealed. To date, no cases of human rights violations involving the Indonesian government against its people have been fully resolved. This situation shows that the handling of cases of human rights violations in Papua has not been optimal, thus deepening the roots of conflict between the Papuan people and the central government.

Indonesia's history is marked by prolonged conflict, violence, and human rights violations, including the 1965 tragedy, which remains one of the nation's darkest chapters. Violence continued in regions like Ambon, Poso, Aceh, Lombok, Probolinggo, and Papua. Researchers have noted that the 20th century was rife with genocide and massacres. Despite entering the 21st century, ethnic, religious, and racial violence persists. In Papua, human rights violations, including killings and attacks on infrastructure workers, continue. Notably, incidents such as the 1968 attack on the Navy Marine Corps, and subsequent violence in Wasior, Wamena, and Paniai, show that the military approach to conflict resolution has only worsened the situation. Although President Joko Widodo promised to address these violations, progress remains lacking.




Figure 1: Data on Areas of Violence in Papua

Source: ([Data on Violence in Papua 2010-2022 - Papua Task Force, Gadjah Mada University](#))

Following up on this, research (gtpapua, n.d.) conducted by Gadjah Mada University and the Papua Task Force in April 2022 showed that between 2010 and 2022 there were 348 cases of violence in Papua and West Papua, with victims reaching 2,118 people, including 464 fatalities. The majority of victims were civilians, reaching 320 people (69%). This illustrates that the security approach taken by the government is still not efficient in overcoming conflict in Papua, because violence continues to occur and the number of victims continues to increase. Human rights activists such as Januarius Nusi from the Papua Peace Network believe that a peaceful approach needs to be applied to end the cycle of violence in Papua. Papua cannot continue to be seen as a region that can only be dealt with through a military approach. Local communities are often perceived as part of armed groups or sympathizers, which exacerbates stereotypes and leads to more casualties among civilians.

Research conducted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), now known as the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), outlines four main root causes of the ongoing issues in Papua: (1) failure in development, (2) marginalization and discrimination of indigenous Papuans, (3) human rights violations, and (4) historical and socio-political issues. Despite the government's efforts to address these concerns, such as the allocation of special autonomy funds and the development of infrastructure like the Trans Papua Road, violence continues to be a persistent problem in the region. This highlights the need for a more comprehensive and balanced solution that addresses the complexity of the issues at hand.

One proposed solution is a peaceful approach through dialogue involving all relevant parties. This dialogue would need to be conducted on equal terms, with a clear agenda and an inclusive format, in order to facilitate a sustainable peace process. Senior LIPI researcher Muridan Satrio emphasizes that dialogue is not detrimental, but rather could be the key to achieving peace in Papua. He stresses that partial or incomplete solutions will only extend the conflict, whereas a comprehensive, inclusive dialogue could offer a binding and sustainable resolution for all parties involved. Looking back at the New Order era, efforts to resolve human rights violations in Papua primarily relied on military strategies, which exacerbated human rights violations and created significant political challenges for the Indonesian government. In the early years of reformasi, a socio-cultural approach was attempted but did not lead to meaningful improvements in the socio-political climate of Papua. Over time, the need for a more nuanced and careful approach became evident.

Under President Joko Widodo's administration, there has been a greater focus on addressing the violence and human rights violations in Papua. This approach aims not only to improve relations between the Papuan people and the Indonesian government but also to restore the trust of the Papuan population in the state's institutions. Efforts include legal remedies, social recovery, justice for victims, and the enhancement of dialogue between the community and the government. These measures reflect a recognition that lasting peace and stability in Papua cannot be achieved through legal and political solutions alone, but also through social healing and engagement.

Ultimately, a comprehensive and locally-sensitive resolution is essential for the long-term peace and stability of Papua. The government's focus on increasing development in various sectors, such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare, is aimed at improving the welfare of the Papuan people and

ensuring sustainable change in the region. However, the success of these efforts will depend largely on the continued commitment to a peaceful, inclusive, and holistic approach to resolving the longstanding issues in Papua. In fact, the approach adopted by the government in Papua to date does not seem to have been able to create a stable and secure situation in the region. Security tensions and turmoil in Papua continue, with groups supporting Papuan independence and a referendum remaining active in mobilizing their movements. These groups consist of two main groups, namely armed groups and political groups, which continue to pose a real threat. Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) carry out attacks on civilians and security forces, damage public facilities, and spread terror in various regions. Meanwhile, the Political Crimes Group (KKP) has further strengthened their position by building an organized and massive network in many districts in Papua. Although both mobilize actions that seem pragmatic, the basis of their movements remains rooted in an ideology that wants secession from Indonesia.

At that time, the National Police had mapped and analyzed the potential risks and disturbances arising from the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) movement by dividing the area into three zones. The Red Zone includes areas with a high concentration of KKB activity, especially in five districts, namely Bintang Mountains, Yahukimo, Nduga, Puncak, and Intan Jaya. While The Yellow Zone includes 11 districts that still face security threats albeit with a lower level of intensity. The districts in the Yellow Zone are also weapons and ammunition distribution routes, such as Jayapura City, Mimika, Keerom, Jayawijaya, Lanny Jaya, Tolikara, Puncak Jaya, Paniai, Diyai, Dogiyai, and Nabire. The Green Zone, which includes 13 districts, is considered relatively safe from KKB disturbances, namely Jayapura, Merauke, Boven Digoel, Mappi, Asmat, Yalimo, Sarmi, Mamberamo Raya, Mamberamo Tengah, Yapen Islands, Waropen, Biak Numfor, and Supiori districts.

The armed criminal group (KKB) in Papua, which aims to secede from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), is categorized as a separatist movement. The designation for this group varies, depending on the views of each institution; the police call it KKB to highlight its criminal aspect, while the Indonesian National Army (TNI) calls it the Armed Separatist Group (KSB) due to their goal of secession. In response to the frequent acts of violence, President Joko Widodo has instructed the TNI Commander and the National Police Chief to take firm action against KKB members. This instruction is reinforced by Article 1 paragraph (2) of Law No. 5 of 2018, Substituting Law No. 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law, which states that:

"Terrorism is an act that involves the use of violence or the threat of violence that creates widespread fear or terror. These acts can result in large numbers of casualties as well as damage or destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities. The motives behind these acts are usually related to ideology, politics, or the aim to disrupt security."

On April 27, 2021, the government designated the Papuan KKB as terrorists, citing their violent actions that threaten public safety, create widespread fear, and are politically motivated to push for independence. This classification aligns with Law No. 5/2018 on Terrorism Eradication, which defines terrorism as acts involving violence or threats that cause terror on a broad scale, endanger public safety, and target vital infrastructure or public facilities. The KKB's actions have significantly impacted civilians, security personnel, and health workers, contributing to instability in the region. Addressing this issue requires a non-military preventive strategy emphasizing peaceful approaches such as dialogue

and diplomacy. Inspired by Gus Dur's pluralist and humanist philosophy, this strategy prioritizes equality, inclusion, and recognition of Papuan identity within the national framework. Gus Dur's approach, grounded in humanity and mutual respect, highlights the need for policies that promote participation and inclusive development while fostering trust and reducing tensions. A peaceful resolution rooted in understanding and equality is essential for achieving sustainable peace in Papua. Reflecting back, in Indonesia terrorist acts can be seen as a very serious violation of the law, namely *treason*, and the perpetrators can be subject to sanctions in accordance with the provisions listed in (Law No. 5 of 2018, n.d.-b) Amendment to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication of the Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law, as a strategic reference for resolving conflict and violence in Papua. However, the question that arises is the extent to which non-military efforts can be taken in dealing with human rights violations committed by the KKB in Papua, Indonesia.

METHODOLOGY

In preparing this research, a normative juridical method was used, which focuses on non-military preventive efforts in the context of Handling Human Rights Violations against Armed Group Violence (KKB). Data is collected through the review of various regulations, ranging from national to regional levels, focusing on aspects of Human Rights Law. In addition, literature studies from books and journals were also used, and text analysis was carried out through the review of important documents, such as Gus Dur's speeches and writings on peaceful politics in Papua, to understand the values and strategies promoted regarding the efforts of non-military channels in dealing with the problem of gross human rights violations that occurred in Papua, Indonesia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The KKB conflict in Papua, Indonesia arose due to various problems that triggered the desire for independence or separation from the Republic of Indonesia. The problems faced by the Papuan people are often seen as a reason to develop Papua without the involvement of the Republic of Indonesia. However, whether secession is the right solution for Papua's progress does not necessarily provide a clear answer. Instead, these problems can be seen as potential for indigenous Papuans to move forward together within the framework of the Republic of Indonesia. Forward movement for the Papuan people can only be realized if they do not feel colonized or oppressed, but are seen as equal to other ethnic groups in Indonesia. For this reason, it is important for feelings of equality and independence to be instilled in the Papuan people through constructive peaceful political policies and thinking.

A. Explore The Dynamics Of The Causes Of The Conflict In Papua, Indonesia

Historically, Papua, previously known as West Irian, was one of the territories that remained under Dutch rule after Indonesia gained its independence. The Dutch planned to make West Irian an independent state, but with the aim of controlling the region as a dependent state, or puppet state. A puppet state refers to a country whose sovereignty is completely controlled by another country. Although Indonesia had gained independence, tensions between the Netherlands and Indonesia continued as both claimed rights to the disputed West Irian (*View of Conflict Analysis and Social Problems in Papua*, n.d.).

This was supported by the fact that on May 1, 1963, West Irian was officially handed over by

the Netherlands to Indonesia, although the Netherlands still maintained control over the territory by forming a separate government. This shows that Papua at that time was not fully integrated with Indonesia. Realizing this situation, President Soekarno took a strategic step by planning operation Trikora to reclaim West Irian. This issue was then brought to the UN forum, which resulted in an agreement in the New York Agreement, where the Netherlands finally agreed to hand over West Irian to Indonesia on the condition that a People's Opinion Determination (Pepera) was carried out. The Act was held in 1969, and the results showed that the people of West Irian voted to join Indonesia, which was then ratified by the UN. Since then, West Irian has officially become part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). In 2002, the name Irian Jaya, previously known as West Irian, was changed. The political integration process in Papua faced various challenges, one of which was the underdevelopment of the region compared to other regions in Indonesia. The name of Irian Jaya was changed to Papua after the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law (Otsus) through (Law No.21 of 2001, n.d.-b).

In this regard, during the reign of President Soeharto, attention to Papua tended to be limited because the main focus of the government was more focused on the interests and development in the Java region. This condition is often referred to as "**Java-centric**", which describes the imbalance in the distribution of resources and attention between Java and other regions, including Papua. As a result, Papua does not receive comparable attention in terms of infrastructure development, social welfare, or economic empowerment. This centrist approach has created imbalances that affect the development of the Papua region. Java-centric (obet, 2024) refers to a view that places Java and its surrounding region as the cultural and political center of Indonesia, often the main basis for national decision-making. This results in other regions, such as Papua, not receiving the attention they deserve. This imbalance has led to a sense of discontent and protest against government policies, which in turn triggered the emergence of separatism movements. The movement is a form of rejection of perceived political injustice, as an effort to demand greater attention and justice for regions that feel marginalized. This separatism movement arises when individuals or groups want to separate themselves to form an independent state or nation with their own government (Sefriani, 2015). One of the groups that carry this ideology is the Armed Violence Group (KKB) which was established in 1965. The Armed Violence Group (Mauna, n.d.) is a separatist movement established in 1965, with the aim of separating from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian government recognized the existence of this organization as a rebellious movement. The group has committed acts of rebellion against the legitimate and sovereign government, which clearly threatens the sovereignty of the Indonesian state.

Currently, in the era of President Jokowi, development in Papua has accelerated with various projects such as the construction of the trans-Papua road, the Papua Bangkit/Lukas Enembe stadium, and other infrastructure, as well as the implementation of fuel price equalization as some examples. Previously, during the reigns of other presidents, efforts were also made to encourage Papua's progress. However, the conflict in Papua continues, which shows that Papua's development is not the only benchmark or the most effective solution to overcome the escalation of conflict. If we look further, the deep reasons for the conflict certainly have a more complex basis than just the issue of lagging development.

(Scott & Tebay, 2005) states that it is a big mistake to think of the Papua problem as not an economic and development issue. He emphasized that the conflict in Papua is not a horizontal conflict between civilians, between indigenous Papuan tribes, between different religious groups, or between Papuans and non-Papuans. According to him, this conflict is vertical, namely between the Indonesian government centered in Jakarta and the OPM group operating in the Land of Papua. In other words, this

conflict is a dispute between the Indonesian government which is trying to maintain Papua as part of the Indonesian state and the OPM which is fighting to separate Papua and form a West Papuan state. Therefore, this conflict is essentially a political conflict.

In line with this, the conflict that occurred in Papua has left deep wounds in their memory (*wounded memory*). These bitter memories have shaped the way they perceive the existence of their tribe, the government, migrants, and various social and political events that occur in Papua. Worse still, they are often excluded from policy-making processes that have a direct impact on their lives and future. They are not treated with respect as human beings, so they are not involved in policy discussions related to Papua (Scott & Tebay, 2005). If this situation continues, then any steps taken by the government to resolve the conflict in Papua will not necessarily solve the problem, either in the short, medium or long term.

In another opinion, LIPI researchers described the conflict between Papua and Jakarta as a "**match**" that reflects Papuans' view of Jakarta as an opponent. In the 1962 New York Agreement "**match**", Papuan leaders were not involved. In the 1969 "match" of the Act of Free Choice, Papuans felt unfairly treated. Then, in the 1977 "game" known as Social Turmoil, which was followed by various military operations in Papua, Papuans felt themselves to be victims in a series of politically violent events characterized by various military operations in the region, which are now considered human rights violations. In the economic context, they feel oppressed by the exploitation and extraction of natural resources without involving them fairly. In addition, in the implementation of Special Autonomy, they feel divided, especially after the division of West Irian Jaya in 2003 and manipulation in the election of members of the Papuan People's Assembly in 2005, which further exacerbated the situation. (*Agenda for Potential Peace in Papua [PDF] [60a11nqh5kh0]*, n.d.).

These conditions eventually led Papuans to feel completely hopeless towards Jakarta. Collectively, there are feelings of marginalization, frustration, cynicism, anger and a complete loss of trust in Jakarta. Worse still, Indonesia is seen by Papuans as a symbol of inequality, violence, injustice and loss of hope. The return of Special Autonomy to the Indonesian Government on August 12, 2005 was one manifestation of these collective feelings. In such a collective mood and mind, it is understandable that the word "independence" has become very important in Papuan political and cultural discourse today (*Agenda for Potential Peace in Papua [PDF] [60a11nqh5kh0]*, n.d.). This discourse is a factor that makes this conflict unending.

Therefore, the feeling of being marginalized in their own homeland is very deep in the Papuan people, so that the discourse on secession from the Republic of Indonesia appears not only as a discourse, but as a reality that is closely related to the history of the incorporation of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia which is considered problematic by some parties. If traced deeper, the causes of conflict in Papua have emerged since the formation of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945. This issue is not only related to feelings of oppression or neglect, but also to the integration process itself. At a meeting held in Saigon, Vietnam, on August 12, 1945 with General Hasaichi Taraci, Soekarno argued that the incorporation of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia did not need to be linked to Indonesian independence, given the condition of the Papuan people who were still classified as primitive at that time. In fact, Mohammad Hatta emphasized that Papuans were a negroid race different from Indonesians in general, which implied that they should be free to determine their own fate (Anugerah, 2020). Such clear racial and cultural differences eventually strengthened the Papuan people's desire to separate themselves, because they felt they were not part of the Republic of Indonesia, which became the core of the prolonged conflict in Papua.

B. The Urgency of Separatism and Human Rights Violations in Papua, Indonesia

Armed Criminal Group (KKB) is a term used by the Indonesian government to refer to armed factions involved in the conflict in Papua, generally considered to be part of the Papuan pro-independence movement. The KKB is often associated with the Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM), a separatist movement that has existed since 1965 and demands independence for Papua from Indonesia. The KKB emerged as a response to Papuan dissatisfaction with the government's treatment, which is considered repressive and discriminatory. The movement consists of several armed factions that have no single command, resulting in frequent inter-group rivalries and conflicts. Among these factions are the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB), led by Goliath Tabuni; the West Papua Revolutionary Army (TRWP), led by Mathias Wenda; and the West Papua National Army (TNPB), led by Fernando Worobay. Each faction has different operational areas and territorial control, creating complex dynamics in the armed conflict in Papua.

The separatist movement of the Armed Violence Group (KKB) or what can also be called the Free Papua Organization (OPM) began on July 26 in Manokwari under the leadership of Permenas Ferry Awom (Mindari, 2022), a former member of the Papuan Volunteer Battalion (Papua Vrijwilinger Corps) who had worked for the Dutch when Papua was under colonialism. Historical research reveals that the Free Papua Organization (OPM) is divided into two main factions, namely the political faction and the military faction. The political faction, led by Terianus Aronggear, SE, focused on gaining support from neighboring countries with similar struggles, while the military faction, led by Aser Demotekay in 1963 to 1964 (*Intelligence Challenges in Papua Facing the Evolution of the Free Papua Movement*, n.d.). The political faction of the OPM seeks to gain support from neighboring countries that have a similar history of struggle, while the military faction acts through rebellion (Hasyim, 2017). Wenda. Currently, the leadership of the political faction is under Beriny Wenda. The two factions exhibit different dynamics in their struggle, with the political faction focusing more on diplomacy and garnering international support, while the military faction emphasizes direct action through insurgency (*Papua Turmoil in Intelligence Perspective*, n.d.).

a. Political Factions of KKB/OPM

Military factions of the armed criminal groups (KKB) or the Free Papua Organization (OPM) have emerged in reaction to Indonesian military involvement in the Papua region. These groups wage armed resistance that often leads to violence, which is often considered a criminal act. Within this military faction are several groups, such as the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) and the National Liberation Army (TPN), which often attack security forces and communities that support the government (*Papua Turmoil in Intelligence Perspective*, n.d.-b). Regions in Papua such as Puncak, Dogiyai, Intan Jaya, Yahukimo, Pegubin, Nduga, Mimika, Jayawijaya, and Jayapura City are known as centers of activity for these groups. As such, these areas have become conflict-prone and continue to receive attention from the police and TNI.

In addition, (Septiadi et al., 2022) The struggle of the Armed Violence Group (KKB) or the Free Papua Organization (OPM) to break away is often accompanied by criminal acts that cause casualties. The government then tried to handle this situation by establishing special autonomy for Papua, equipped with a large budget. However, unfortunately, these funds are not well channeled to the wider community, but are only enjoyed by certain elite groups. This condition triggered anger and encouraged the OPM to fight back in the form of acts of violence that repeatedly claimed lives.

Based on recent data (TRIANA, 2024) Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) in Papua have triggered

significant violent incidents, attacking both security forces and civilians. Recent reports indicate the involvement of the KKB in a number of shootings and acts of terror targeting air transportation. For example, on February 6, 2024, the KKB opened fire on a Smart Air plane at the Baya Biru District Airstrip, injuring two people, including a security officer. A similar incident occurred on February 16, 2024 when an Asia One Air Caravan plane was attacked, although there were no casualties. In addition, KKB also launched an attack on a Wings Air plane at Nop Goliat Airport which resulted in two passengers being injured. Data during 2023, there were 209 violent incidents related to the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) caused 79 people to lose their lives, including 37 civilians and 20 TNI members. In the previous year, the death toll from KKB action totaled 53 people from a total of 90 incidents. Meanwhile, (Susetyo, 2019) some other notable incidents include the hostage taking of Istaka Karya project workers in December 2018, which resulted in the deaths of 19 workers. In addition, KKB also terrorized public facilities and carried out attacks on civilians in various locations, such as in Puncak Regency and Intan Jaya (FHUI, n.d.).

(Hernawan, n.d.) in his dissertation, notes the situation of the security forces in charge (ABRI) during the PEPERA preparations:

"During this period, the UN administration received 156 complaints from various elements of Papuan society. Thirty five letters specifically mentioned 'political prisoner, killing, repressions of freedom of expression, torture' and even 'bombing' committed by the Indonesian military"

As some Papuans resisted integration, the number of soldiers in the region continued to increase over the years. A significant increase occurred when Soeharto established ABRI and implemented ABRI's dual function policy as part of the New Order. ABRI members in Papua were then placed in various important positions, including regional heads and DPRD members, both before and after the 1971 elections. The deployment of soldiers to Papua intensified, along with the increasing number of human rights violations that occurred, which were recorded under various names of operations. During the DOM (1982-1998), (Securitization of Papua: Implications of the Security Approach for Human Rights Conditions in Papua, n.d.) according to a report by Imparsial, Papua was overrun by military, intelligence, and police forces, exacerbating the situation there. In Imparsial report, it is written:

"And since 1982, Papua has been given the status of a Military Operation Area (DOM). The DOM status (1982-1998, pen.) resulted in this area being filled with military officers, intelligence officers, and police officers in proportion to the population density. In 1982-1983, there was an exodus of thousands of refugees from West Papua to Papua New Guinea."

As a result, the exploitation of natural resources such as mining, forests and timber is one of the factors exacerbating violence and discrimination in Papua, creating inequities in economic sharing and worsening access to employment opportunities, infrastructure and basic services such as health and education. Land transfers and natural resource exploitation, coupled with a dominant military presence, exacerbate the situation by marginalizing and discriminating against indigenous Papuans. Ultimately, this has led to deep poverty and serious human rights violations. (McGibbon, 2004) describes how Papuans felt about the New Order development:

"Achieving these objectives in Papua, however, proved elusive. Far from enhancing national

integration, the modernization strategy galvanized local resistance. The New Order's resource mobilization strategy was translated on the ground into what many Papuans saw as a resource grab by outsiders. The security forces' role in protecting resources companies against claims from traditional landowners generated strong resentment in indigenous Papuan communities. At the heart of this conflict was the complaint that indigenous land ownership was being trampled on by both the government and resource companies"

Therefore, the exploitation, violence, poverty and discrimination experienced by the Papuan people have triggered resistance and separatism. Although the term OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) was initially used by the Indonesian government to discredit the resistance movement, over time, it has become a symbol of pride for them as a movement fighting for independence. Elmslie notes that the OPM resistance, which lasted 39 years from 1961 to 1999, intensified over time. This created strength and solidarity in the struggle, which in Richard Chauvel's view, developed into a solid Papuan nationalism (Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation, n.d.).

Not surprisingly, the armed criminal group (KKB) often claims that their attacks are directed at targets that are considered part of the Indonesian military apparatus.

b. Military factions of the KKB/OPM

The Free Papua Movement (OPM) military group was formed as a form of resistance to Indonesian military involvement in Papua. Within this faction, there are two main groups known as the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) and the National Liberation Army (TPN). Both groups often commit acts of violence that often lead to criminal acts, including attacking security forces and civilians who are considered to support the government. Several regions in Papua, such as Puncak, Dogiyai, Intan Jaya, Yahukimo, Pegubin, Nduga, Mimika, Jayawijaya, and Jayapura City, are the main operating sites for these groups. These areas have long been known as conflict-prone areas and receive intense attention from the police and TNI (Rifandhana et al., 2024).

Reflecting on 2018, the government classified the group as an Armed Criminal Group (KKB) (Matildha, 2022). The term was used because of the violence and crimes committed by KKB in Papua and West Papua. The conflict continues, with this armed group carrying out separatist actions that have led to armed confrontations between TPNPB or TPN and TNI- Polri officers in the region (*Cenderawasih Mosaic*, n.d.). The KKB rejects foreign interference and the Indonesian government's intervention in Papua, and wants to manage and govern independently in their territory.

PT Freeport Indonesia has faced numerous violent incidents perpetrated by armed groups, highlighting the precarious security situation in Papua. Among the most notable events are the killing of a New Zealand worker in 2020, the 2023 hostage-taking of Susi Air pilot Captain Phillip Merthens, and attacks on TNI-Polri personnel, including the deaths of six soldiers in Nduga. Armed groups have also burned down schools, further exacerbating the dire situation and intensifying human rights violations. These issues are intertwined with longstanding disputes over land rights, with indigenous Amungme and Kamoro communities demanding recognition and compensation for the exploitation of their customary lands. Although Indonesia now holds a 51% stake in PT Freeport, tensions persist due to unresolved environmental concerns and inadequate engagement with local communities. Calls for dialogue between Jakarta and Papua, often emphasized by humanitarian organizations, remain hindered by slow progress, perpetuating human rights abuses and fostering mistrust.

In addition to security challenges, Papuans face systemic discrimination and legal inequities. Incidents

such as the 2022 Mappi case, where TNI personnel accused of violence were not prosecuted, reinforce perceptions of government indifference toward justice for Papuans. These grievances are compounded by discriminatory acts, such as the forced eviction of Papuan students in Surabaya, and ineffective policies related to special autonomy, which many Papuans view as irrelevant and unresponsive to their needs. The failure to deliver meaningful progress under these policies has fueled criticism and deepened alienation among local communities. This complex conflict not only perpetuates violence but also disrupts economic and social development in Papua. Negative stereotypes about Papuans as the root of problems persist, creating a paradox as not all aspects of life in the region are conflict-ridden. Addressing these issues requires not only legal and social reforms but also a genuine commitment to inclusive dialogue and equitable development to build trust and achieve lasting peace in the region.

C. Gus Dur's Conception of Peaceful Political Approach

Concerned Indonesians have attempted to map the roots of the conflict in Papua, which can essentially be summarized as a political conflict. In this case, the emphasis on political conflict is not intended to trace or seek solutions that translate directly into practical political policies. Our aim is to explore the underlying elements of the conflict, and to develop a more political way of thinking in-depth on how to build the right political constellation in the face of this complex situation.

In modern societies, problems become more complex as religions, ideologies, and political views diversify. Therefore, the concepts of justice, fairness, legitimacy and welfare cannot be separated from real social problems. These concepts also need to be understood in the context of self- understanding of individuals or social groups that are involved and have interests. As stated by (MADUNG, 2013), it is important to pay attention to these social dynamics. In this context, Gus Dur's thoughts are very relevant and contextual to discuss. Although Gus Dur did not explicitly formulate the concept of peace politics, we can capture some of his thoughts that reflect the principles of peace in politics, which are reflected in his various thoughts that are full of reflection and depth.\



Gambar 2. Presiden Gus Dur bertemu dengan masyarakat Muslim di Sebuah Masjid Merauke Papua 30 Desember 1999.

Sumber : Biro Dokumentasi dan Mass Media Sekretaris Negara RI

Gus Dur's basic thinking cannot be separated from the influence of his status as a cleric, which helped shape his political mindset (*Analysis of Abdurrahman Wahid's (Gus Dur) Thoughts on Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia - Walisongo Repository*, n.d.). As a great scholar who is known to be very pluralist, Gus Dur is considered worthy of being called a hero of pluralism in Indonesia. He not only voiced ideas about pluralism, but also realized it through real actions in his life. Gus Dur became a figure who showed Islam as a mercy for all nature, freeing the Indonesian Chinese community and other minority groups, such as the Ahmadiyah, from oppression and discrimination. He was the first to break the shackles of oppression experienced by the Chinese community since the New Order era, making him respected as a figure who even deserved the Nobel Peace Prize. Through his role, Gus Dur is considered to have instilled the values of peace, pluralism and multiculturalism, not only for the people of Indonesia, but also in the organization he led, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (faiq, n.d.).

Gus Dur's life background, which is closer to a rational approach, produces a pattern of thought that tends to be liberal and inclusive. This led him to emphasize human values in various aspects of life. In the political dynamics in Indonesia, there are several cornerstones of Gus Dur's thinking that return humans to their true values as Gus Dur taught important values in life, which include deep faith, respect for human dignity, and a commitment to realizing justice and equality for all. He also emphasized the importance of liberation from all forms of oppression, living with simplicity, and upholding the spirit of brotherhood between people. In addition, Gus Dur considered that chivalry and respect for tradition were an integral part of building a better and dignified nation. (Muhammad Arifudin & Achmad Nasrulloh, 2023b). In this paper, the author will only highlight the pillars of thought that are directly related to the topic of this discussion.

In the concept of monotheism, Allah SWT is believed to be the One Almighty called by 99 names that glorify Him. This monotheism is not only related to personal beliefs, but also reflected in attitudes and struggles in the social, political, economic and cultural fields to uphold human values. The essence of humanity is a reflection of God's attributes, which teaches that every individual has a dignity that deserves respect and appreciation. By glorifying humans, we actually glorify the Creator, while actions that demean and damage human dignity also mean demeaning God. Basically, commitment to humanity involves mutual respect, fostering tolerance and showing a strong concern for the creation of social harmony (Fuada, 2022).

The concept of humanity is essentially reflected through concrete actions that respect human dignity, based on the principles of justice, equality and freedom. This justice stems from the understanding that human dignity can only be realized if there is balance, feasibility, and appropriateness in social life. Therefore, providing protection and fighting for the rights of groups of people who experience injustice is a moral obligation that must be carried out in the name of humanity.

In this case, equality means providing equality, building equal relations, and removing stigmatization, subordination, and marginalization of society. With this, every part of society is free from feeling oppressed or suppressed. Only those who have a truly free spirit, without fear and full of authenticity, can bring the spirit of liberation to life. This principle was always championed by Gus Dur who sought to inspire and support the emergence of free souls. Those who feel free and empowered without feeling left behind will be able to form harmonious communities in a spirit of brotherhood.

In fact, Indonesia already has the basic foundation and strength necessary to implement the essential pillars as the existential core of the Indonesian people. These foundations are reflected in Pancasila and the democratic system it implements. In Gus Dur's thinking, Pancasila not only acts as the basis of national life, but also as a framework that accommodates our society as a nation. Pancasila is expected to be able to accommodate the aspirations of religions functionally without causing conflict, because the existential nature of human beings in Pancasila places the values of brotherhood, liberation,

equality, and justice as top priorities. There is no conflict between Pancasila and religion, and that is what Gus Dur fought for throughout his life, especially when he became President of Indonesia. He managed to break away from the New Order system that oppressed democracy and these pillars of value.

Looking at the New Order era, the government was very strict and authoritarian, requiring all parties to comply with the rules and restrictions that had been set. Freedom of expression was severely Looking at the New Order era, the government was very strict and authoritarian, requiring all restricted, and even criticism of the government was strictly forbidden. Any form of resistance, including satire or dagelan with an oppositional tone, was considered an act of resistance that could have fatal consequences. Anyone who dared to resist would be hunted down, arrested and imprisoned (Indrawan, 2021). Faced with this reality, Gus Dur tried to release Indonesia from the shackles of authoritarianism and restore the principles of true democracy.

Therefore, Gus Dur emphasized that in the democratic system promoted by Indonesia, there are three essential values that must be upheld, namely freedom, justice and deliberation, which during the New Order era were often ignored. Freedom refers to an individual's right to be free from the pressure of state power and society. Meanwhile, justice is seen as the basis of democracy that allows everyone, indiscriminately, to live life according to their aspirations. Everyone has the right to choose their own path, and therefore, there needs to be easy access for the entire community so that they are not hampered by obstacles such as those that occurred during the New Order era. Deliberation here functions as a mechanism that maintains freedom and fights for justice through a process of discussion and consensus. For Gus Dur, these core values of democracy are in line with religious goals that prioritize justice for the common good. Democracy that contradicts religious principles is considered inappropriate, because the two should go hand in hand in creating a just and civilized society.

D. Implementation of Gus Dur's Peaceful Political Approach in Dealing with the Escalation of Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) and Efforts to Handle Human Rights Violations (HAM).

The peaceful political approach exemplified by Gus Dur offers a unique perspective in dealing with conflicts caused by armed criminal groups, especially in the context of human rights violations. By emphasizing diplomacy, peace, and a humanist approach, Gus Dur sought to reduce conflict and uphold human rights. This approach encourages a more peaceful handling of conflict and focuses on the welfare of all parties involved, without overriding the protection of human rights as the main foundation in easing tensions and achieving social stability. The dispute sparked by the armed criminal group (KKB) in Papua is a political issue rooted in demands for freedom, independence and equal treatment for Papuans, both in terms of their basic rights and in relation to other Indonesians. The Indonesian government has designated the KKB as a terrorist group, but they remain persistent in their fight for independence for indigenous Papuans who are considered oppressed. This liberation effort is leading to a larger aspiration for complete separation from the bonds of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

In this regard, the Indonesian government remains concerned about separatist movements, but efforts to tackle these groups cannot continue to rely on the deployment of security forces such as the TNI and POLRI. In addition, dialogue, intensified development in Papua, and the expansion of special autonomy are also insufficient to solve this problem. Therefore, it is important for the government to re-evaluate the implementation of the democratic system in Papua, especially regarding the treatment of ethnic Papuans. The question is whether the policies implemented by Indonesia truly reflect the principles of democracy in the context of Papua?

Gus Dur criticized the New Order's perspective that simplified democracy as a matter of institutions alone, without understanding its deeper nature. For Gus Dur, democracy should be understood as a culture that develops continuously and provides space for all elements of the nation to feel justice and freedom. If there are still people who feel oppressed or not treated equally, then democracy has not been fully implemented. With great anger, Gus Dur strongly rejected if the noble principles of democracy were ignored or trampled upon. In his view, the ideal democracy is when all citizens have equality before the law, legal sovereignty becomes the main foundation rather than the sovereignty of power, freedom of speech is guaranteed as widely as possible, and there is a clear and independent separation between the executive, legislative and judicial functions (farabi, 2017).

Gus Dur criticized the implementation of democracy in Indonesia through thoughts based on the pillars of humanity. According to him, democracy must be based on the values of divinity, humanity, justice, equality, liberation, simplicity, brotherhood, chivalry, and traditional wisdom, which not only stops at the concept level, but is also realized in the implementation of democracy daily life of the Indonesian people. These ideas form the basis for efforts to build a peaceful and just national life, which is often marked by conflict. In the midst of increasing conflict in Papua, Gus Dur's ideas offer a solution in the form of an approach that strengthens faith in God Almighty, which leads to respect for a just and civilized humanity. This implementation can be seen in the dialogue between the government and separatist groups, which emphasizes the spirit of justice, equality and tolerance. All religions, which teach peace and justice, according to Gus Dur, can be the basis for strengthening the solidarity of the nation's children. To support this, inclusive religious education is needed, which respects diversity, and ideally is implemented in the education curriculum.

The concept of divinity needs to be supported by the humanitarian pillar, because conflict resolution that relies solely on military force often brings many casualties, both on the part of the government and separatist groups. The deployment of security forces often ignores humanitarian values, which is contrary to Gus Dur's vision. For Gus Dur, human dignity is a divine gift that must be respected, including for the Papuan people. Unfortunately, development and Special Autonomy (Otsus) policies in Papua are mostly enjoyed by a handful of elites, while people at the grassroots are still left behind. Without development that honors humanity, this injustice has the potential to worsen Papua's situation in the future. Inspired by Gus Dur's thoughts, empowering local Papuans is an important step to honoring their humanity. Including Papuans in local decision-making and development can strengthen social ties and reduce the potential for conflict. This process also reflects democratic values, as decisions are expected to be made not only by the central government or elites, but also by Papuan community representatives such as traditional and religious leaders.

Drawing inspiration from Gus Dur's principles, empowering Papuans is crucial to ensuring their rights and dignity. This involves their active inclusion in local decision-making and development processes, emphasizing the role of traditional and religious leaders alongside the government. Efforts such as education, skills training, and local economic development can address social inequalities, while promoting Papuan cultural identity fosters inclusiveness and reduces alienation. The wisdom of local customs should guide decision-making, ensuring the respect for human rights, freedom of expression, and assembly. Gus Dur's vision of justice calls for equality without discrimination, supported by equitable access to education, healthcare, and infrastructure, including in remote areas. Emphasizing a sense of brotherhood, as advocated by Gus Dur, strengthens dialogue and development efforts, transforming them into meaningful actions for conflict resolution. His values of courage, integrity, responsibility, and patience provide a solid foundation for reducing tensions and fostering national unity in Papua.

E. Critical Arithmetic of the demand for an independent BHS in Realizing a Bi-nationality in Papua Based on the Political Perspective of Peace by Gus Dur

Today, President Gus Dur's era understands that the root cause of violence and resistance in Papua is not the people themselves, but the repressive policies inherited from the New Order. The regime created injustice and discrimination that left deep wounds for the Papuan people. As a figure who opposed violence and injustice, Gus Dur saw that the best solution was not military force, but through dialogue that accommodated the rights of Papuan citizens who had been marginalized (non-military). Even so, Gus Dur not only inherited the repressive system of the New Order, but also the transitional policies of President Habibie's era that had made significant changes during the Reformation period, including efforts to dialogue with representatives of regions experiencing conflict (*Ahmad Suaedy - Gus Dur, Islam Nusantara, and Bineka Citizenship: Resolving the Aceh and Papua Conflicts 1999-2001* (2018): Ahmad Suaedy : Free Download, Borrow, and Stream : Internet Archive, n.d.).

Looking deep into efforts to resolve the conflict against the Armed Violence Group (KKB) in Papua, Gus Dur emphasized that a repressive approach would only make matters worse and strengthen the desire for independence. Therefore, the author prioritizes re-capitulating violence prevention measures that can ease tensions, with a focus on dialogue and peaceful resolution. Reflecting on Gus Dur's belief that an approach that prioritizes humanity and understanding of the root causes of problems will be more effective in creating lasting peace. Here are some steps that the author prioritizes as a concrete reference in resolving human rights violations committed by the KKB, as follows:

a. Opening the Space for Peaceful Dialogue with a Humanist Approach

Looking back, before visiting Jayapura at the start of the second millennium, amidst political tensions and widespread demands for Papuan independence, President Gus Dur already had close relationships with a number of important figures in Papua. These relationships were established through interactions with religious leaders and NGO activists. One important platform was the PGI (Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia) Litbang, led by Rev. Karel Phil Erari, a Papuan figure (Kompas.Id, n.d.). Gus Dur often attended annual seminars organized by Litbang PGI, which were also attended by officials from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Here, Gus Dur gained an in-depth understanding of Papuan issues, which allowed him to immediately recognize and touch the problem in an up-close and personal way (Schulze, n.d.-b).

(ALFAJRI, 2020) Gus Dur also established good relations with NGO activists, including Agus Sumule, who was involved in discussions about the state of Papua since the 1970s. Activists such as Manuel Kaisiepo, who worked with Gus Dur at LP3ES, revealed that Gus Dur had more in-depth knowledge of the Papuan condition than many others, including himself. When Gus Dur finally became president, he set up a special team to map out Papua's problems and dialogue with various parties, including religious leaders and Papuans. This shows that Gus Dur had communicated directly and strategized to solve the Papua problem long before making policy decisions.

With a dialogic and persuasive approach, Gus Dur acted quickly when he heard the escalating demands for independence in Papua. Instead of using a repressive approach, he chose to implement more peaceful measures. One important step he took was to issue Presidential Decree No. 173/1999 granting amnesty and abolition to 72 Papuan political prisoners and 33 political convicts. This decision sent a strong signal that Gus Dur was committed to ending the oppressive past and opening up space for more constructive dialog.

In addition, Gus Dur gave real recognition to the Papuan people by placing their representatives in important positions in government. In the cabinet formed in October 1999, Gus Dur appointed Ir. Freddy Numberi as Minister of State for Administrative Reform. Subsequently, in the August 2000 reshuffle, Manuel Kaisiepo was appointed as Junior Minister for the Acceleration of Development of Eastern Indonesia, a ministry aimed at accelerating development and equity in Papua (admin, n.d.). Gus Dur also assigned Manuel to develop the ministry's program, in the belief that only someone who really knew Papua could develop the right program. Through this policy, Gus Dur showed great commitment to bringing positive change to Papua, through a more inclusive and dialog-based approach.

Reflecting on the December 31, 1999 meeting, it has a very important meaning as a moment of direct dialog aimed at understanding each other. Unlike ordinary meetings that tend to be one-sided, President Gus Dur listened more to the voices of the Papuan people on this occasion. For them, this meeting was a historic step, as they were able to speak directly to a president on their land, without any restrictions or barriers. Although there were limited seats available, the high level of enthusiasm meant that many people attended, some even having to stand. The meeting involved a wide range of people, from different groups and religions, to traditional and professional representatives from across Papua, adding value and diversity to the dialogue, creating freedom of expression, and providing a sense of security to the people. Gus Dur saw that a peaceful solution must begin with recognizing the equality of Papuans as part of the Indonesian nation and guaranteeing their security by limiting acts of violence by the TNI and Polri. This approach marked the first step in a shift from repressive policies to a more inclusive and humanist approach to embracing the Papuan people.

b. Recognition of Papuan Identity and Culture

“for the first time, Papuans nationalists had the opportunity to come together openly (in Wahid era, pen.) in a collective undertaking that was covered by print and electronic media from every corner of the world” -Aleksius Jemadu (Book Details, 2018)

During President Gus Dur's tenure, the discourse on the demand for independence in Papua peaked. This phenomenon occurred amidst the turbulent dynamics of post-Reformasi democracy, where people were free to express their aspirations, including calls for independence. In this situation, (The Aceh Peace Process: Why It Failed, n.d.) Gus Dur chose open dialogue approach, allowing various public expressions such as the raising of separatist flags and protests without being immediately perceived as a threat to the state. This strategy reflects an effort to embrace people's aspirations and then find a compromise solution.

Despite the complicated political situation in Papua, President Gus Dur demonstrated his commitment to opening dialogue and personal approaches to various groups in Papua. This approach, expression, especially in Papua. However, Gus Dur emphasized strict limits, namely the rejection of demands for independence and the prohibition of violence. His close relationship with local Papuan figures, such as religious and adat leaders, and NGO activists, led Gus Dur to believe that independence aspirations were not easily realized, especially if the central government was able to offer solutions that promised to improve the quality of life of the Papuan people in the future. Thus, there is a balance between groups that support autonomy - hence the term "pro-integration". "pro-integration" is not as popular in Papua as it was in East Timor before the referendum - and those in favor of independence among activists

and Papuans.

In this regard, the entire political process, from party formation to elections to presidential inauguration, took place quickly after reformasi. Examining the referendum conflict in East Timor, which ended with the decision for Timor Leste's independence, left a mark of trauma on the Indonesian government. This situation encouraged people, especially in Papua, in the network of Armed Violence Groups (KKB) to increasingly loudly demand the right to self-determination, inspired by the successful results of the East Timor referendum.

Reflecting (PP, 2022) The referendum in East Timor in August 1999 became a catalyst for similar demands in other regions, especially Papua. Although President Habibie used the term "*community consultation*" instead of a referendum, the results still showed the strong desire of the East Timorese people for independence, with 78.5 percent voting to separate from Indonesia. This experience was a bitter lesson for the Indonesian government and military, as well as emphasizing the importance of understanding the aspirations of the people in determining state policy.

Historically, governments have often shown harsh and repressive attitudes in the face of demands from their citizens, especially when they feel overwhelmed by controlling popular anger. A clear example, (Schulze, n.d.) is the case of East Timor, which despite heavy pressure and violence to maintain its integration with Indonesia, eventually led to the independence of the region. This inspired other regions, particularly Papua, which had also long experienced tension and violence from the state. The fear of similar demands making the military, police and politicians at the central and local levels increasingly wary, suggests that accommodating different regional aspirations has not really materialized in the reform process as it should.

During President Gus Dur's presidency, the articulation of anger and aspirations from the people of Aceh and Papua increased as part of a peaceful dialog to find solutions. Unlike the previous era, which was often characterized by violence by the authorities, Gus Dur managed to maintain calm by instructing the security forces not to use violence, even though the situation was very tense. During these moments, no bullets were fired, indicating a change in the government's approach to dealing with popular movements demanding peace, justice and freedom, giving hope for a more peaceful dialogue and respect for human rights amidst the wave of reform.

President Gus Dur therefore faced a major challenge to convince Papuans that the Indonesian government was truly on their side and concerned about their welfare. To achieve this, Gus Dur dared to take innovative steps in peaceful communication and negotiation. He used cultural approaches and built close personal relationships with the Papuan people. However, a deep understanding of the historical and psychological background of the Papuan people is required for this approach to be effective and meaningful.

c. Guaranteeing Freedom of Assembly and Expression

The process of peaceful negotiation in expressing the aspirations of all parties is an important key to building mutual understanding. As Gus Dur did in handling the conflict in Aceh, he dared to take risky policy steps to ensure that the will of the Papuan people could be conveyed. One of the approaches taken was to find a peaceful solution by guaranteeing the right to assemble, express opinions, and provide a sense of security. When people hold meetings, the government provides protection to ensure the smooth running and security of these activities. In many actions, demonstrations and public meetings in Papua, Gus Dur personally provided guarantees for these activities, which he considered part of the dialog and negotiation process.

From early January to mid-February 2000, Papua experienced significant dynamics following

President Gus Dur's visit to Jayapura. Various minor incidents occurred, such as the raising of the Morning Star flag during a traditional feast in the Teminabuan, Ayamaru and Beraur sub-districts of Sorong Regency. In Timika, crowds welcomed the return of their representatives from Jayapura - who had previously dialogued with President Gus Dur - by parading the Morning Star flag. In addition, calls for independence continued to echo in various regions, both at the district level and in the provincial capital, Jayapura. In response to the demand for independence, the Regent of Sorong, John Piet Wanane, stated on January 13 that the aspiration should be conveyed to Jakarta, as it was the authority of the MPR, while the local government did not have the authority to handle it (OpenLibrary.org, n.d.).

The mubes was a historic moment for the Papuan people, where for the first time they were able to express their aspirations and grievances openly and freely (tomei-mist, 2023). The forum was also attended by representatives of Papuan activists from various countries in the Pacific region, such as Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, as well as some refugees from Australia and Europe. It provided an independent space free from political and security pressures, allowing Papuans and their leaders to discuss their future and aspirations freely (OpenLibrary.org, n.d.-b).

This meeting is considered very representative because it involves almost all ethnicities, sub-ethnicities, religions, professions, and regions in Papua. Not only that, the presence of invitations from outside Papua, especially those from the Melanesian family and the Pacific geopolitical region, provided a new dimension that enriched the discussion. For the Papuan people, this mubes is the first momentum that really gives them the opportunity to express their hearts and determine the direction of their lives without intervention from any party.

Through the commissions formed, the deliberation generally discussed three main agendas: (1) a commission to straighten out the history of Papua, (2) a commission dealing with the political agenda, and (3) the consolidation of various Papuan elements for future struggles (Obituary of Agus Alue Alua: A Life of Dedication to the Papuan People, n.d.). The straightening of Papuan history focuses on a critical evaluation of the process of Papua's integration into Indonesia, including the involvement of the Netherlands, the United States and the United Nations. This perspective also criticizes the implementation of PEPERA (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat), which is considered to have deviated from the provisions of the New York Agreement. New York Agreement 1962, where voting was supposed to be direct. However, in reality, PEPERA was implemented through a representative mechanism or the Noken method, coupled with military intervention during its implementation.

On December 1, 1961, the Papuan Council was given the mandate to fight for Papuan sovereignty by fulfilling various sovereignty requirements, such as having a flag, coat of arms, national anthem, and a clear territorial area. In addition, (Obituary of Agus Alue Alua: A Life of Dedication to the Papuan People (Obituary of Agus Alue Alua: A Life of Dedication to the Papuan People, n.d.) The Papuan Presidium is also tasked with holding military generals accountable for human rights violations that have occurred in Papua since the integration of Irian Jaya in 1963, during the Military Operation Area (DOM), and beyond. The Papuan Council was also instructed to engage relevant international parties to strengthen global diplomacy on the struggle.

As a political tool, the Papuan Council is designed to achieve these goals through the Papuan Elements Consolidation Commission. The Council consists of the Papua Council Panel, whose members include

representatives from each region of Papua as well as the three international regions of Asia, the Pacific and Europe. The Papuan Council Panel has ultimate political authority, including the decision to maintain or dissolve the Council, and to appoint or dismiss its executive body.

Therefore, the Papuan Presidium was formed to carry out the daily operational duties of the Papuan Council. The chairmen of the Presidium are Theys Hiyo Eluay (traditional leader) and Tom Beanal (politician), accompanied by moderators such as Herman Awom (religious leader), Benny Giey (scholar), and Frans-Albert Joku (traditional leader). Other members include women leaders (Beatriks Koibur and Ketty Yabansabra), politicians (Isack Ayomi), scholars (Don Flassy), students (Martinus Werimon and Leo Imbiri), former political prisoners (Elieser Awom and John S. Mambor), historical figures (Fred Suebu and Melkias Mandosir), youth leaders (Andi Manobi and Yacob Kasima), and religious leaders (H. Muh. Said Sabuku).

So, President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) received a report on the results of the big meeting through the organizing committee and expressed his willingness to provide assistance of 1 billion rupiah to support the implementation of the Second Papuan People's Congress as a follow-up to the meeting. In contrast to the general view that the Papuan People's Congress II (KRP II) was a preparation for Papuan independence that could threaten the integrity of the state, so that the omission of its implementation by President Gus Dur was considered to support separatism, Gus Dur actually had a different view. For him, forums such as KRP II were an opportunity to listen directly and clearly to the aspirations of the Papuan people. In accordance with his principles, President Gus Dur believed that thoughts, discussions, and even the desire for independence could not be prohibited, unless they violated the law or if there was a unilateral declaration.

This view is similar to the desire of certain groups to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia-thinking and desiring such things cannot be prohibited, what is prohibited is unilaterally declaring an Islamic state. Therefore, although KRP II was controversial, President Gus Dur firmly guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly, and security during the dialog and negotiation process.

One of the important moments in the initial steps of the socialization of the KRP II plan occurred at the Papuan Council Presidium meeting on 16-19 April 2000 through PDP decree No.A.03/KEP-PDP/IV-2000. During the meeting, it was decided to hold an event that was considered historic as part of a broader socialization effort, namely the celebration of 1 May 2000 as the day of the start of general socialization towards the Papuan People's Congress II in 2000. The choice of May 1 was based on the fact that on that day, the Indonesian government celebrated the integration of West Irian into the Indonesian state or the liberation of West Irian by Trikora forces. The choice of date was thus a response to the official narrative of West Irian integration. After the decision was made, members of the Papuan Council Presidium and Panel traveled to various regions to conduct socialization through various forums, such as discussions and workshops.

President Gus Dur supported the aspirations of the Papuan people by allowing the Papuan People's Congress II (KRP II) to proceed, even contributing 1 billion rupiah to its implementation. While he did not attend the congress to avoid legitimizing independence aspirations, he respected its purpose as a forum for Papuan voices. Gus Dur facilitated progress in addressing Papua's concerns, including supporting the election of J.P. Solossa as Governor and initiating the drafting of the Papua Special Autonomy Law, which

incorporated many aspirations from the congress. Despite opposition and political challenges, Gus Dur's policies emphasized mutual trust, dialogue, and acknowledgment of Papuans as equal citizens. His efforts, embodied in the Special Autonomy Law, laid the groundwork for peaceful conflict resolution, though the independence issue remained unresolved.

d. Institutional Transformation in the Accommodation of Papua for Permanent Peace

"Internal sovereignty would encompass concern for the areas of culture, education, language, religion, finance, judicial administration, and public safety, as well as certain industrial, energy, and infrastructure project, while external competencies should include as many dimensions as possible for permitting a community maximum freedom to interact with its neighbors, in the region and with other states and international organizations."

-Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber (*Autonomy, Self-Governance and Conflict Resolution, n.d.*)



Gambar 3. Presiden Gus Dur Mendapatkan Cinderamata Dari Masyarakat Adat di Aceh 25 Januari 2000
Sumber : Biro Dokumentasi dan Mass Media Sekretariat Negara RI

Looking at the proposed Papua Special Autonomy Bill, it emerged after seeing the dynamics that occurred in Aceh, which was discussing a similar matter. At that time, in Irian Jaya, the situation continued to develop, and with the guarantee of freedom and security from President Gus Dur's administration, Papuan representatives in Jakarta, whether in the DPR, MPR, or other institutions, began to consolidate themselves and discuss the possibility of submitting a draft of the Papua Special Autonomy Bill. They worked closely with Aceh representatives who were discussing the Special Autonomy Bill Aceh in the DPR, although this cooperation has actually been established since the 1999 MPR General Assembly and the discussion of the 1945 Constitutional Amendment, especially in PAH 1 (Indonesia, 2021)

The Assistance Team faced challenges from two sides in its efforts to formulate Special Autonomy (Otsus) for Papua. On the one hand, elements within the central government tried to block the formulation of Otsus that came from the Papuan people, while on the other hand, some Papuans demanded independence and rejected the autonomy option. Nevertheless, the Assistance Team worked quickly, and by April 2001, a draft was ready for negotiation with the central government, in this case, the Ministry of Home Affairs (Depdagri). The draft was expected to be part of the discussion agenda in the DPR RI.

However, this process did not go smoothly, as the Ministry of Home Affairs also drafted a similar bill that claimed to be based on the aspirations of the Papuan people. The Ministry of Home Affairs' draft

was even submitted to the Legislation Body (Baleg) of the House of Representatives (DPR RI), although with the same title This raised suspicions among the Assistance Team and Papuan representatives that the Ministry of Home Affairs was deliberately taking precedence to thwart the draft that had been prepared by the Papuan people. It is known that the Ministry of Home Affairs' draft is not fully in line with the aspirations contained in the Assistance Team's draft.

Despite suspicions that the Special Autonomy Bill could be a step towards independence, the Assistance Team remains committed to the bill bringing positive change to the Papuan people. Agus Sumule recounted that when they went to President Gus Dur, there was no debate or obstruction in the discussion. In fact, President Gus Dur guaranteed full support for the bill and ordered the F-KB in the DPR to fight for and convince the DPR to pass the bill.

The draft prepared by the Assistance Team eventually became the DPR's initiative proposal, which was then discussed further, instead of the draft submitted by the government or the Ministry of Home Affairs (Depdagri). The Ministry of Home Affairs agreed to withdraw their draft of the Papua Special Autonomy Bill, and the DPR then used it as a companion text or reference. Thus, the draft Papua Special Autonomy Bill that was discussed in the DPR came entirely from the aspirations of the Papuan people, serving as a middle ground that tried to mediate between the extremes of those who favored autonomy and those who wanted independence. The process of drafting the bill took about four months, from January to April 2001, while the negotiations and lobbying that took place between April and July 2001 also lasted almost as long.

Agus Sumule, writes:

"Despite these challenges, we believe that Special Autonomy can be used as a way to accommodate and process the aspirations of the Papuan people within the context of the legal system of the Republic of Indonesia. Moreover, Special Autonomy can be seen as a peaceful response by most Papuans to the Central Government of the Republic of Indonesia."

The proposed initiative of the House of Representatives was submitted by the Chairman of the Special Committee, Sabam Sirait, with the title "A Bill on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province in the Form of a Self-Governing Area." The letter, submitted on April 15, 2001, was signed by all 25 Papuan representatives in the DPR and MPR. However, an explanation of the proposal was only made in the plenary session on July 19, 2001, along with the ratification of the proposal and the formation of the Special Committee, a few days before President Gus Dur was dismissed by the MPR.

CONCLUSION

The Papua Road Map by LIPI identifies development failure, discrimination, human rights violations, and historical-political issues as root causes of conflict in Papua, highlighting the need for inclusive dialogue and non-military approaches to achieve sustainable peace. Despite government efforts like special autonomy and infrastructure projects, indigenous Papuans continue to face marginalization and economic disparities, feeling excluded from policies in their ancestral land. Inspired by Gus Dur's peaceful political philosophy, solutions emphasize dialogue, cultural recognition, fair law enforcement, and responsive policies that prioritize human rights and welfare. Legal frameworks such as Laws No. 39/1999 and 26/2000 provide a basis for ensuring equality, fostering trust, and promoting unity, aiming to address grievances and create lasting harmony in Papua.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to God Almighty for His infinite grace and guidance, without which this thesis would not have been possible to complete. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to the Faculty of Law, Mulawarman University for the invaluable support and opportunities provided during the research and writing process. My appreciation goes to all those who have contributed, either directly or indirectly, to the development and publication of this work.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Mr. Sholihin Bone, SH, MH who has provided valuable assistance and direction in writing this journal. My gratitude also goes to Ms. Adji Annisa Rahmadina (Ms. Icha) who helped at every stage of this writing process. The support and contribution from Mr. Sholihin Bone, S.H., M.H and Kak Icha mean a lot to me, so that this journal can be completed properly. May all the help and kindness that has been given be rewarded with continued success and blessings.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my lovely family (mom, dad & my sister) and also my best friend Syabila Syaputri for her continuous support, encouragement, and assistance during the writing of this journal. Her presence throughout this journey has been a source of strength and motivation. I hope that this journal can be a meaningful contribution to discussions on peace, human rights and conflict resolution in Papua, and inspire further discussions and policies that promote sustainable and inclusive development across Indonesia. May all efforts made by all parties be rewarded with continued success and blessings.

REFERENCES

- Agenda potensi damai di papua [PDF] [60a11nqh5kh0]*. (n.d.). Retrieved November 6, 2024, from <https://vdoc.pub/documents/agenda-potensi-damai-di-papua-60a11nqh5kh0>
- Analisis pemikiran Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) tentang partai politik Islam di Indonesia - Walisongo Repository*. (n.d.). <https://eprints.walisongo.ac.id/id/eprint/8032/>
- Anugerah, B. (2020). Papua: Mengurai Konflik dan Merumuskan Solusi. *Jurnal Lemhannas RI*, 7(4), 51–65. <https://doi.org/10.55960/jlri.v7i4.111>
- Awaludin, H. (2012). *HAM: Politik, hukum & kemunafikan internasional*.
- Dewi, N. K. T. C. (2024, April 14). Inilah 4 akar masalah papua menurut LIPI. *TEMPO.CO*. <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1856485/inilah-4-akar-masalah-papua-menurut-lipi>
- Enam Ahammad, S. (2023a). GENOCIDE: CAUSES BEHIND A GRAVEST STATE CRIME. *PETITA: JURNAL KAJIAN ILMU HUKUM DAN SYARIAH*, 8(1). <https://doi.org/10.22373/petita.v8i1.167>
- Enam Ahammad, S. (2023b). GENOCIDE: CAUSES BEHIND A GRAVEST STATE CRIME. *PETITA: JURNAL KAJIAN ILMU HUKUM DAN SYARIAH*, 8(1). <https://doi.org/10.22373/petita.v8i1.167> faiq. (n.d.).
- Farabi, jurnal. (2017, August 17). *pemikiran keagamaan dan kebangsaan gus dur*. Jurnal Farabi - Academia.Edu. https://www.academia.edu/34252947/pemikiran_keagamaan_dan_kebangsaan_gus_dur
- FHUI, H. H. F. (n.d.). *KKB, KKSb, dan Konstruksi Sosial Politik Terorisme Oleh: Heru Susetyo*) – Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia*. Retrieved November 7, 2024, from <https://law.ui.ac.id/kkb-kksb-dan-konstruksi-sosial-politik-terorisme-oleh-heru-susetyo/>
- Fuada, A. R. (2022, January 12). *KONSEP PENDIDIKAN PERDAMAIAN KH. ABDURRAHMAN WAHID DALAM PERSPEKTIF PENDIDIKAN ISLAM*. <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/58914>

- Gtpapua. (n.d.). *Data Kekerasan di Papua Tahun 2010-2022 – Gugus Tugas Papua Universitas Gadjah Mada*. Retrieved November 5, 2024, from <https://gtpapua.wg.ugm.ac.id/data-kekerasan-di-papua-tahun-2010-2022/>
- Hardiyanto, L., & Saryono, S. (2023). Penguatan lembaga perlindungan ham untuk menciptakan keadilan dan pembangunan masyarakat papua. *Jurnal Citizenship Virtues*, 3(1), 454–461. <https://doi.org/10.37640/jcv.v3i1.1732>
- Hasyim, M. M. A. (2017, July 7). *Diplomasi Indonesia dalam Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Terhadap Penjagaan Kedaulatan NKRI di Papua Barat Periode 2013-2016*. <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/41225>
- Idris, M. (2009). PEMBARUAN PENDIDIKAN ISLAM DALAM KONTEKS PENDIDIKAN NASIONAL. *Lentera Pendidikan: Jurnal Ilmu Tarbiyah Dan Keguruan*, 12(1), 13–32. <https://doi.org/10.24252/lp.2009v12n1a2>
- Indrawan, J. (2021). Mekanisme Resolusi Konflik di ASEAN: ASEAN Sebagai Fasilitator Konflik. *Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional*, 17(2), 172–185. <https://doi.org/10.26593/jihi.v17i2.3830.172-185>
- Istiqomah, M. (2022, March 14). *Yang Harus Dilakukan Pemerintah untuk Tuntaskan KKB di Papua*. PT Justika Siar Publika. <https://www.hukumonline.com/klinik/a/yang-harus-dilakukan-pemerintah-untuk-tuntaskan-kkb-di-papua-lt600b813430323/>
- Kaisupy, D. A., & Maing, S. G. (2021). PROSES NEGOSIASI KONFLIK PAPUA: DIALOG JAKARTA-PAPUA. *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Humaniora*, 10(1), 82. <https://doi.org/10.23887/jish-undiksha.v10i1.27056>
- Kompas, H. (2022). KKB Bukan Kisah Pertama Kekerasan di Papua, Akankah yang Terakhir ? - YouTube [Video]. In *Harian Kompas*. <https://youtu.be/3uxmXK9Td1A?si=Swy7YmxAZqiTrzqx>
- Letsoin, Y. S., Baunsele, O. R., & Taroreh, T. (2023). Mengusung Politik Damai Abdurrahman Wahid dalam Mengatasi Eskalasi Konflik Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata dengan Tentara Nasional Indonesia di Papua. *Jurnal Politik Profetik*, 11(2), 169–185. <https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v11i2a3>
- MADUNG, O. G. N. (2013, January 1). *FILSAFAT politik: negara Dalam bentangan diskursus filosofis*. Repository Institut Filsafat Dan Teknologi Kreatif Ledalero. <http://repository.iftkledalero.ac.id/id/eprint/188>
- Matildha, M. (2022). TINJAUAN YURIDIS TERHADAP PENETAPAN STATUS ORGANISASI PAPUA MERDEKA SEBAGAI KELOMPOK TERORIS. *LEX ADMINISTRATUM*, 10(1).
- Mauna, author B. (n.d.). *Hukum internasional : Pengertian, peranan dan fungsi dalam era dinamika global*. Universitas Indonesia Library. Retrieved November 6, 2024, from <https://lib.ui.ac.id/detail.jsp?id=20162618>
- Mindari, E. S. (2022, July 28). *Analisis Studi kasus konflik Papua merdeka Menggunakan Sudut Pandang Paul Feyerabend*. Unknown. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380995791_Analisis_Studi_Kasus_Konflik_Papua_Merdeka_Menggunakan_Sudut_Pandang_Paul_Feyerabend
- Mosaik Cenderawasih*. (n.d.). *Pembangunan Dan Kesejahteraan Di Tanah Papua*. Retrieved November 7, 2024, from <https://obor.or.id/Mosaik-Cenderawasih-Pembangunan-dan-Kesejahteraan-di-Tanah-Papua>
- Muhammad Arifudin, & Achmad Nasrulloh. (2023a). KONSEP PEMIKIRAN PENDIDIKAN ISLAM KH. ABDURRAHMAN WAHID DALAM MENGHADAPI PERKEMBANGAN ERA MODERN. *INOVATIF: Jurnal Penelitian Pendidikan, Agama, Dan Kebudayaan*, 9(2), 146–162. <https://doi.org/10.55148/inovatif.v9i2.326>
- Muhammad Arifudin, & Achmad Nasrulloh. (2023b). KONSEP PEMIKIRAN PENDIDIKAN ISLAM

- KH. ABDURRAHMAN WAHID DALAM MENGHADAPI PERKEMBANGAN ERA MODERN. *INOVATIF: Jurnal Penelitian Pendidikan, Agama, Dan Kebudayaan*, 9(2), 146–162. <https://doi.org/10.55148/inovatif.v9i2.326>
- Obet, Rohman. (2024, January 26). *Tantangan jawa-sentrisme: Menuju keseimbangan pembangunan*. Fakultas Ilmu Budaya. <https://fib.unair.ac.id/fib/2024/01/26/tantangan-jawa-sentrisme-menuju-keseimbangan-pembangunan/>
- RAHAYU, K. Y. (2022, July 16). Usut Pelanggaran Pidana dan HAM Serangan KKB di Papua. *Harian Kompas*. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2022/07/16/usut-pelanggaran-pidana-dan-ham-serangan-kkb-di-papua>
- Rifandhana, R. F., Wahyono, B. A., Suardi, S., Prasetyo, I., Tengor, G. M., & Rayrego, Y. (2024). Government and conflict handling of free papua organizations in human rights approach. *JED (Jurnal Etika Demokrasi)*, 9(2), 215–230. <https://doi.org/10.26618/jed.v9i2.14854>
- Robert Hendrik, & Endah Ratna Sonya. (2024). Analisis Konflik dan Masalah Sosial di Papua. *Jurnal Humaya: Jurnal Hukum, Humaniora, Masyarakat, Dan Budaya*, 4(1), 32–46. <https://doi.org/10.33830/humaya.v4i1.5309>
- Scott, C., & Tebay, N. (2005). The West Papua conflict and its consequences for the Island of New Guinea: Root causes and the campaign for Papua, land of peace. *The Round Table*, 94(382), 599–612. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530500331826>
- Sefriani, S. (2015). PELANGGARAN RUANG UDARA OLEH PESAWAT ASING MENURUT HUKUM INTERNASIONAL DAN HUKUM NASIONAL INDONESIA. *JURNAL HUKUM IUS QUIA IUSTUM*, 22(4), 538–565. <https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol22.iss4.art2>
- Septiadi, M. A., Sofa, N. G., Syarah, S., & Shakira, W. (2022a). KEKEJAMAN KKB PAPUA YANG MELANGGAR HAM. *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik Malikussaleh (JSPM)*, 3(2), 273. <https://doi.org/10.29103/jspm.v3i2.7453>
- Septiadi, M. A., Sofa, N. G., Syarah, S., & Shakira, W. (2022b). KEKEJAMAN KKB PAPUA YANG MELANGGAR HAM. *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik Malikussaleh (JSPM)*, 3(2), 273. <https://doi.org/10.29103/jspm.v3i2.7453>
- Sihaloho, R. A. H. (2023). NARASI DIALOG DAMAI PAPUA-JAKARTA DALAM BINGKAI KETAHANAN NASIONAL DAN IMPLEMENTASINYA. *Masyarakat Indonesia*, 48(1), 93–103. <https://doi.org/10.14203/jmi.v48i1.1184>
- Suropati, U. (2019). Solusi Komprehensif Menuju Papua Baru: Penyelesaian Konflik Papua Secara Damai, Adil dan Bermartabat. *Jurnal Lemhannas RI*, 7(1), 73–89. <https://doi.org/10.55960/jlri.v7i1.52>
- Susetyo, H. (2019, April 4). KKB, KKS, dan Konstruksi Sosial Politik Terorisme. *Hukumonline.Com*. <https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/kkb-kks-dan-konstruksi-sosial-politik-terorisme-lt5ca5a938d7296/>
- Tebay, N. (2016). TRANSFORMASI KONFLIK PAPUA. *Limen : Jurnal Agama Dan Kebudayaan*, 12(2, April), 82–106. <https://doi.org/10.61792/lim.v12i2>, April.21
- Tempo. (2024, April 17). Pelanggaran HAM Berat Papua OPM. *KORAN.TEMPO.CO*. <https://koran.tempo.co/read/editorial/488116/pelanggaran-ham-berat-papua-opm>
- TRIANA, N. (2024a, August 7). Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata di Papua, Apa Saja Kekerasan yang Dilakukan? *Harian Kompas*. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/nusantara/2024/08/06/kelompok-kriminal-bersenjata-di-papua-apa-saja-kekerasan-yang-dilakukan>
- TRIANA, N. (2024b, August 7). Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata di Papua, Apa Saja Kekerasan yang Dilakukan? *Harian Kompas*. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/nusantara/2024/08/06/kelompok-kriminal-bersenjata-di-papua-apa-saja-kekerasan-yang-dilakukan>
- Widyanantara, I. G. H. (2022). PENEGAKAN HUKUM TERHADAP PELANGGARAN HAK ASASI

MANUSIA DALAM MEWUJUDKAN KEADILAN DI PAPUA. *JISOS: JURNAL ILMU SOSIAL*, 1(7), 585–600.

(N.d.). <https://ejournal.uinib.ac.id/jurnal/index.php/aladyan/article/view/171>

Legal Documents

UU no. 5 tahun 2018. (n.d.-a). Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK. Retrieved November 6, 2024, from <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/82689/uu-no-5-tahun-2018>

UU no. 5 tahun 2018. (n.d.-b). Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK. Retrieved November 6, 2024, from <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/82689/uu-no-5-tahun-2018>

UU no. 21 tahun 2001. (n.d.-a). Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK. Retrieved November 5, 2024, from <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/44901/uu-no-21-tahun-2001>

UU no. 21 tahun 2001. (n.d.-b). Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK. Retrieved November 6, 2024, from <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/44901/uu-no-21-tahun-2001>

UU no. 5 tahun 2018. (n.d.-a). Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK. Retrieved November 6, 2024, from <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/82689/uu-no-5-tahun-2018>

UU no. 5 tahun 2018. (n.d.-b). Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK. Retrieved November 6, 2024, from <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/82689/uu-no-5-tahun-2018>

UU no. 21 tahun 2001. (n.d.-a). Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK. Retrieved November 5, 2024, from <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/44901/uu-no-21-tahun-2001>

UU no. 21 tahun 2001. (n.d.-b). Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK. Retrieved November 6, 2024, from <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/44901/uu-no-21-tahun-2001>

View of Analisis Konflik dan Masalah Sosial di Papua. (n.d.). https://jurnal.ut.ac.id/index.php/humaya_fhisip/article/view/5309/1947